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The Principles and the Presumption 
of Equality
S t e fa n  G o s e pa t h
A methodically well-grounded procedure is required if one wishes to pro-
ceed from basic moral premises to a theory of rights and justice. I wish to 
advocate the presumption of equality as a possible candidate for such a proce-
dure. The presumption of equality is a prima facie principle of equal distri-
bution for all goods that many scholars of political theory as well as public 
decision-makers/public opinion deem politically suitable for the process of 
public distribution. Applied to this domain, the presumption of equality 
requires that everyone, regardless of individual differences, should have an 
equal share in the distribution unless certain types of relevant differences 
justify, on universally acceptable grounds, unequal distribution. A  strict 
principle of equal distribution is not required, but it is morally necessary to 
justify impartially any unequal distribution. Although this procedural prin-
ciple is upheld by many scholars, albeit in different terms, one only rarely 
finds an explicit justification for it.
The aim of this paper is to offer such a justification in four steps. In section 
8.1, the relation between the abstract concepts of justice and three well-known 
principles of equality—namely, (a) formal equality, (b) proportional equality, 
and (c) moral equality—and the relation between moral equality and social 
equality will be elaborated on. Section 8.2 introduces the presumption of 
equality as a necessary feature of any concrete conception of just treatment 
and distribution. Section 8.3 discusses and rejects different attempts to justify 
the presumption of equality. In section 8.4, finally, a substantive justification 
of the presumption of equality will be given that links the presumption back to 
the basic notions of justice and morals.
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8.1 Principles of Equality
Equality in its prescriptive usage has, of course, a close connection with 
morality and justice in general and distributive justice in particular. From 
antiquity onward, equality has been considered a constitutive feature of jus-
tice. Throughout history, emancipatory movements have used the language of 
justice to pillory existing social inequalities. But what exactly is the connec-
tion between equality and justice, i.e., what kind of role does equality play in a 
theory of justice?
Depending on which philosophical perspective one adopts, contrary 
answers may suggest themselves. Both equality and inequality are complex 
and multifaceted concepts.1 In any real historical context, it is clear that no 
single notion of equality can claim hegemony.2 Many egalitarians concede that 
much of our discussion of the concept is vague and abstract, but they believe 
that there is also a common underlying strain of important moral concerns 
implicit in it.3 Above all, the concept of equality serves to remind us of our 
common humanity, despite our various differences. From this point of view, 
then, equality appears, while not as one single principle, still as a one coherent 
idea that consists of a complex group of different principles. This is attested by 
the fact that, up to this day, philosophers have defended a variety of principles 
of equality, four of which will be mentioned in the following discussion.
Three well-known principles of equality seem today rather uncontroversial; 
namely, (a) formal equality, (b) proportional equality, and (c) moral equality. 
They will be quickly introduced in the following paragraphs to lay the founda-
tions for the introduction and justification of a forth and much more contro-
versial principle; namely, the presumption of equality.
(a) Formal Equality:  when two persons have equal status in at least one 
normatively relevant respect, they must be treated equally with regard to this 
respect. This is the generally accepted formal equality principle that Aristotle 
formulated in reference to Plato: “treat like cases as like.”4 Of course, the cru-
cial question is which respects are normatively relevant and which are not. The 
formal postulate remains quite empty as long as it is unclear when or on the 
grounds of which features persons or cases should be considered equal. All 
1  See Larry Temkin, Inequality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), ch. 2.
2  See Douglas W. Rae, Equalities (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 132.
3  See Bernard Williams, “The Idea of Equality,” in Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1973), 230–249.
4  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes 
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1984), V.3. 1131a10–b15; Aristotle, Politics, in:  ibid., 
III.9.1280 a8–15, III. 12. 1282b18–1282b23.
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debates over the proper conception of justice, i.e., over who is due what, can 
be understood as controversies over the question of which cases are equal and 
which are unequal.5 For this reason, equality theorists are correct in stressing 
that the claim that persons are owed equality becomes informative only when 
one is told what kind of equality they are owed.6
What is at stake here is a moral principle of justice, and with it the impartial 
and universalizable nature of moral judgments in general: for if the postulate 
of formal equality is morally acceptable, then more is required than simple 
consistency of the principle with one’s subjective preferences. What is more 
important is its possible justification vis-à-vis others that are the potential sub-
jects of the equal or unequal treatment in question—and this solely on the 
basis of the situation’s objective features. That is, in order for the formal prin-
ciple of equality to become a morally binding standard, one has to proceed 
from it to a more substantial, well-grounded principle of equality that can be 
justified to all persons concerned. One such substantialization of the principle 
of formal equality is the principle of proportional equality.
(b) Proportional Equality:  according to Aristotle, there are two kinds of 
equality, numerical and proportional.7 A  form of treatment of others or, as 
a result of it, a distribution is numerically equal when it treats all persons as 
indistinguishable, thus granting them the same quantity of a good, per capita. 
That is not always just. In contrast, a form of treatment of others or a distri-
bution is proportional or relatively equal when it treats all relevant persons in 
relation to their due. Just numerical equality is, according to Aristotle, a spe-
cial case of proportional equality: numerical equality is only just under special 
circumstances, viz. if persons are equal in distributionally relevant respects, 
then the corresponding proportions of the distributed goods must be equal 
too. Proportional equality specifies formal equality further; it is the more pre-
cise and detailed, hence, actually the more comprehensive formulation of what 
formal equality must entail in order to be morally acceptable. It indicates what 
produces an adequate equality: if factors speak for unequal treatment or dis-
tribution because the persons concerned are unequal in relevant respects, the 
treatment or distribution proportional to these factors is just. Unequal claims 
to treatment or distribution must be considered proportionally: this is the pre-
requisite for persons being considered equally in a just sense.
5  Aristotle, Politics, 1282b 22.
6  See Thomas Nagel, “Equality,” in Mortal Questions (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 1979), 106–127; Douglas W. Rae, Equalities (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); 
Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Oxford: Clarendon Press; Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1992), 13.
7  See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1130b–1132b; Plato, Laws, in Complete Works, ed. John 
M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), VI.757b–757c.
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(c) Moral Equality and Social Equality: even though the principle of pro-
portional equality is a widely accepted standard of distributional justice nowa-
days, there is a minimal overlapping consensus among all leading schools of 
modern Western political and moral culture that some fundamental features 
of people may not be used to justify their unequal treatment and must thus 
be excluded from considerations of proportional distribution.8 More specifi-
cally, in spite of descriptive differences in certain relevant respects, all persons 
should be regarded and treated as moral equals, so that they are essentially enti-
tled to the same basic moral rights and duties. The principle of treatment as an 
equal is not the same as equal treatment; it does not imply being entitled to an 
equal share, but being treated as a free and equal person.9 Following this asser-
tion of the fundamental moral equality of all persons, different persons should 
be equal in their social status. This is the morally and politically fundamental 
principle of basic moral equality. As a moral ideal, it asserts that all people are 
of equal moral worth (or in other words: equal dignity) and that there are some 
claims that people are entitled to make on one another simply by virtue of their 
status as persons.10
Since “treatment as an equal” is an almost universally shared moral stan-
dard in contemporary theory, present-day philosophical debates are concerned 
with the kind of equal treatment is normatively required when we mutually 
consider ourselves persons with equal dignity. The principle of moral equal-
ity is too abstract and needs to be made concrete if we are to arrive at a clear 
moral standard. Nevertheless, no conception of just equality can be deduced 
from the notion of moral equality. Rather, we find competing philosophical 
conceptions of equal treatment serving as interpretations of moral equality. 
These need to be assessed according to their degree of fidelity to the deeper 
ideal of moral equality.11
From moral equality, one can derive a prohibition on arbitrary unequal 
treatment; that is, a prohibition on discrimination. Even if justice already 
implies that nobody should be arbitrarily put at a disadvantage, this 
8  See Gregory Vlastos, “Justice and Equality,” in Social Justice, ed. Richard Brandt (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 31–72. This does not mean that this demand for the basic equality 
of all humans is in fact universally recognized; on the contrary, there are serious anti-egalitarian 
critics who argue against equality for different reasons. For a recent discussion see Uwe Steinhoff, 
ed., Basic Equality (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
9  See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness. A Restatement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2001), section 7, who prefers to speak of the “idea of free and equal persons.”
10  See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 
1977), 179–183; esp. 277 and his well-known formulations “treating as equals” and “equal con-
cern and respect” which, however, require further interpretation and elaboration.
11  Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 44.
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explication still leaves open which differences between persons are morally 
irrelevant and therefore should not be considered and which differences are 
to be considered. Moral equality does not completely fill in this variable, but it 
restricts it in an important respect. Different treatments of concerned parties 
based on differences in gender, race, social background, ethnicity, language, 
culture, religion or due to social hierarchies, etc., are morally arbitrary. This 
is because differences in natural endowments are differences for which the 
respective people are not themselves responsible, and therefore cannot justify 
different treatment. Otherwise the principle of moral equality would be vio-
lated. Thus primary discrimination (as one might call it) is excluded. Primary 
discrimination is to be understood as unequal treatment on the assumption 
of given differences of value between people that justifies allegedly different 
(often proportional) claims, whereas secondary discrimination is a differen-
tial treatment of persons who are regarded as morally equivalent.12 The purest 
form of the principle of primary discrimination is the norm that attributed 
character differences determines the value of a person and that the treatment 
or distribution has to follow this different value.13 In this sense, the principle 
of primary discrimination represents the opposite of the principle of moral 
equality. As such, primary discrimination includes all forms of oppression, 
whether people are subjected to exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, 
cultural imperialism or violence.14 Characteristic of the modern understand-
ing of morality is that one can no longer believe in the possibility of a nonarbi-
trary, impartial justification of primary discrimination. This could refer only 
to metaphysical truths, which one can contest without being unreasonable. 
Moral equality follows negatively from the reasonable insight into the fail-
ure of all attempts at a nonarbitrary justification of primary discrimination. 
The struggle against primary discrimination of all kinds is and remains thus 
a classic egalitarian concern. It represents the heart of egalitarianism, which, 
despite general philosophical acceptance, has lost nothing of its political rel-
evance. 15
Through the prohibition and struggle against every form of primary 
discrimination, the claim of each person to be treated as morally equal 
should secure their fundamental, equal social and political status as equally 
12  See Ernst Tugendhat, Vorlesungen über Ethik (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1993), 375–378.
13  Ibid., chap. 3, esp. 47–51.
14  See Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990), ch. 2.
15  Those critics who criticize the more extensive distributive principles of modern egalitarian-
ism also stress this, because egalitarianism no longer corresponds to its central concern, e.g., Iris 
Marion Young in Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) 
and Elizabeth Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109, no. 2 (1999): 287–337.
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legitimate members of society. These claims to social and political equality are 
thus also based on the acknowledgement of universal moral equality. They 
also exclude all unequal, hierarchical forms of social relationships by which 
some people dominate, exploit, marginalize, demean, and inflict violence on 
others: “As a social ideal, it holds that a human society must be conceived of 
as a cooperative arrangement among equals, each of whom enjoys the same 
social standing. As a political ideal, it highlights the claims that citizens are 
entitled to make on one another by virtue of their status as citizens, with-
out any need for a moralized accounting of the details of their particular 
circumstances.”16
These aspects of political and social equality therefore fall under the 
principle of moral equality, but they do not exhaust it. Forms of second-
ary discrimination or differentiation are not excluded from moral, and in 
this respect, social equality, if they are compatible with the recognition of 
equal social status of concerned parties, as for example, differences accord-
ing to merit, need, but also, if appropriate, according to race, gender, and 
background, as in cases of affirmative action or fair punishment. “Where 
there is social equality, people feel that each member of the community 
enjoys an equal standing with all the rest that overrides their unequal ratings 
along particular dimensions.”17 The upshot is that moral equality requires 
social and political equality but leaves open the question whether other 
dimensions such as e.g., a person’s natural talents, creativity, intelligence, 
innovative skills or entrepreneurial ability can be the basis for legitimate 
inequalities.18 This fact should make it already clear that claims to social and 
political equality, as justified as they are, can never exhaust all justified enti-
tlement to justice and equality in the social and political sphere. Thus, even 
16  Samuel Scheffler, “What is Egalitarianism?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 31, no. 1 (2003): 22 
and Samuel Scheffler, “Choice, Circumstances and the Value of Equality,” Politics, Philosophy & 
Economics 4, no. 1 (2005): 5–28.
17  David Miller, “Equality and Justice,” Ratio 10, no. 3 (1997):  232. Miller regards social 
equality as a value distinct from justice, as does Jonathan Wolff, “Fairness, Respect, and the 
Egalitarian Ethos,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 27, no. 2 (1998): 97–122. For examples of views 
that draw both on justice and on a value of social equality distinct from justice, see Thomas 
Scanlon, “The Diversity of Objections to Inequality,” in The Lindley Lecture, Lawrence: University 
of Kansas (1996) and Martin O’Neill, “What Should Egalitarians Believe?” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 36, no. 2 (2008): 119–156.
18  That these are forms of illegitimate inequalities is the claim of so-called “luck-egalitarians” 
e.g., Ronald Dworkin, “What Is Equality? Part  2:  Equality of Resources,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 10, no. 4 (1981):  283–345; Richard Arneson, “Equality and Equality of Opportunity 
for Welfare,” in Equality:  Selected Readings, ed. Louis Pojman and Robert Westmoreland 
(New  York:  Oxford University Press, 1997), 229–241 and G. A.  Cohen, “On the Currency of 
Egalitarian Justice,” Ethics 99, no. 4 (1989): 906–944.
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if one sees social justice in a society as analogous to friendship or marriage 
as a relationship of equals19 (as unrealistic as that might be), the question 
of which kinds of secondary discrimination or specification are required by 
justice is still left entirely open.
To determine any morally appropriate conduct requires more than a ref-
erence to equal social status or standing. This is important because in order 
to adjudicate a claim to a legitimate equal or legitimate unequal standing to 
others in society, one first of all needs a comparative standard. Secondly, one 
needs a certain conception of what an equal standing in society amounts 
to and implies in terms of rights and goods. Since forms of oppression and 
domination, e.g., marginalization, status hierarchy, domination, exploita-
tion, and disrespect, are seldom self-evident, the question arises about the 
legitimacy and justification of such claims. Recourse must be made to a the-
ory of morality and justice, which by means of a justification procedure is 
able to assess claims as appropriate or inappropriate. For justice is concerned 
with which claims about what things (i.e., treatment or goods) are to be justified 
vis-à-vis whom on what grounds. Imperatives of justice always have to do with 
fair treatments and shares, which can be determined only in procedures of 
justification.
This requirement of universal and reciprocal justification is linked to the 
morality of equal respect in that this morality demands that each individual 
becomes equally considered in every instance of justification and distribu-
tion. This principle states that norms can be regarded as justified if, and only 
if, free and equal persons, who wish to regulate their co-existence by means 
of such norms, are rationally able to agree on the norms in question.20 Since 
it is immoral to force someone to do something of which he or she does not 
approve, only reasons acceptable to the other person can give one the moral 
right to treat this person in a specific way. According to the principle of moral 
equality, two people regard each other as equals if each accepts the obliga-
tion to justify their actions by principles acceptable to the other, and in which 
they take mutual consultation, reciprocation, and recognition for granted. 
Equal consideration is thus accorded to all persons and their interests. Equal 
19  For such a view, see: Scheffler, “What is egalitarianism?” 22.
20  For such views, see Immanuel Kant, Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, [1785] 1997); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 2nd 
ed. (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, [1971] 1999); Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to 
Each Other (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), esp. ch. 5; Jürgen Habermas, Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990); Bruce Ackerman, 
Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1980), esp. ch. I.; Rainer 
Forst, The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011).
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respect, which we reciprocally owe to one another, thus requires respect for 
the autonomous decisions of each noninterchangeable individual. The core 
of the value of equality is a normative conception of human relations. This 
normative conception sees the autonomy of each individual as the standard 
of justification for general rules, norms, rights, etc. To treat persons as equals 
and to grant them social and political equality amounts to granting them a 
right to justification.
With these clarifications and specifications of moral equality, it should be 
clear that “equal” or “equal measure” in the context of moral equality is in no 
way “purely formal” or “empty” or “redundant”—as alleged by critics. 21 Here, 
rather, it refers to the independence of moral justification from all power rela-
tions and primary discriminations. This principle excludes certain differences, 
such as first- and second-class citizens, as morally unjustified. It allows only 
those differences that are determined by means of justification procedures to 
be in principle acceptable by all. “Equal” and “equal measure” have therefore 
an essential function in this principle.
8.2 Introducing the Presumption
In order for moral equality to become more concrete than moral, social and 
political equality and for it to be applicable, one has to proceed from these 
ideals to an even more concrete principle of equality. Thus, the questions that 
remain to be answered are the following: first, which kind of equal treatment 
or distribution is normatively required if we reciprocally regard each other as 
persons of equal dignity and of equal social and political standing? Otherwise 
it would remain unclear what moral equality and social justice as social rela-
tionships of equals demand in terms of treatment and distribution. Thus we 
have to know: by means of which procedural principle shall we construct a 
substantial conception of just treatment and distribution from the abstract 
premise of “moral equality”? Once we have adopted such a procedural prin-
ciple, the second problem that needs to be solved is: according to which cri-
teria shall we apply it; that is, what are the normatively relevant criteria that 
shall decide the equal or unequal treatment of individuals and distribution of 
resources to them?
21  See H.L.A. Hart, “Between Utility and Rights,” Columbia Law Review 79, no. 5 (1979): fn. 
42; Robert Goodin, Political Theory and Public Policy (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), 
89f; Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), 6; Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), chap. 9.; 
J. R. Lucas, “Against Equality,” Philosophy 40, no. 154 (1965): 296–307.
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At first sight, the answer to the question, i.e., which kind of distribu-
tion is normatively required under the premise of moral equality, seems 
clear. Insofar as one can generally and reciprocally justify certain differ-
ences among individuals—beyond their equal dignity—as being relevant 
in terms of treatment and distribution, it is imperative that they be treated 
proportionally to those differences. Proportional equality is thus the prin-
ciple of formal equality.
To give an example, children and adults should, according to this princi-
ple, normally partake of different amounts of calories in order to satisfy their 
equal claim to adequate and sufficient nutrition. The adequate allocation of 
calories then is a case of proportional equality. Adults and children are treated 
unequally in terms of what they receive (namely, unequal amounts of calories) 
but are treated equally in terms of their claim to adequate nutrition. Reasons 
for an unequal distribution are proportionally accounted for; this is the pre-
condition for the consideration of everyone as equal. Therefore, consideration 
and a fortiori treatment as equals means equal treatment in proportion but not 
in result.
If we assume that there is no persuasive alternative to proportional 
equality, because the known alternatives—such as market-based liberal 
theories of property, needs-based theories, aggregate theories that are 
egalitarian only in an instrumental sense (such as utilitarianism), or a 
theory of complete, strict, numerical equal treatment—seem implausible 
and unjust for a number of reasons, then we must determine those criteria 
that are capable of justifying equality or inequality of people in terms of 
treatment and distribution.22 Once we know which (descriptive) features 
are morally relevant, it is neither necessary nor even possible to stipulate 
a primacy of (quantitatively or numerically) equal distribution anymore, 
for it is those criteria that then determine the mode of distribution in the 
first place.
However, the question of how we shall proceed in those cases where we do 
not have relevant criteria at our disposal or where no relevant differences can 
be found remains to be answered. Thus, we are looking for a secondary prin-
ciple that is the default option if the primary principle of distributive justice, 
i.e., proportional equality, is not applicable.
22  This is actually a core debate among social egalitarians. However, the criteria for a justi-
fied unequal distribution need not be discussed here. The following arguments still work inde-
pendently of which relevant criteria will turn out to be justified. More on the justification of 
these criteria can be found in Stefan Gosepath, Gleiche Gerechtigkeit. Grundlagen eines liberalen 
Egalitarismus (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2004), ch. V.
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It is precisely here, I submit, that the procedural principle of the presumption 
of equality takes effect.23 This is a prima facie principle of equal distribution for 
all distributable social goods: 24
Everyone must be treated numerically or strictly equally irre-
spective of their descriptive differences, unless certain (types) of 
difference(s) are presently relevant and successfully justify, through 
generally acceptable reasons, unequal treatment or unequal 
distribution.
23  This approach is not uncommon. To name the most prominent proponents: Henry Sidgwick 
speaks in The Methods of Ethics (London:  Macmillan, 1874), 380 of onus probandi (burden of 
proof). Hugo Bedau (in “Egalitarianism and the Idea of Equality,” in Equality (Nomos IX), ed. 
J. Roland Pennock and John Chapman (New York: Atherton Press, 1967), 3–27 and Gosepath 
(in Gleiche Gerechtigkeit, ch. II.8) call this postulate of equality the ‘presumption for equality.’ 
Stanley Benn and Richard Peters speak in their influential discussion in Social Principles and 
the Democratic State (London: Allen & Unwin, 1959), 111 of a ‘presumption against inequality.” 
Bernard Williams calls it in “The Idea of Equality,” in Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1973), 230–249 the ‘relevant reasons approach’; Richard Hare in Freedom and 
Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 118 the ‘corollary of the requirement of universality’; 
Ernst Tugendhat in Dialog in Leticia (Frankfurt a.M.:  Suhrkamp, 1997), ch. III the ‘postulate 
of symmetry’ (Symmetriesatz); Wilfried Hinsch in Gerechtfertigte Ungleichheiten. Grundsätze 
sozialer Gerechtigkeit (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2002) the ‘default option.” See also Derek 
E.  Browne, “The Presumption of Equality,” The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53, no. 1 
(1975): 46–53; Peter Westen, Speaking of Equality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 
230 ff.
24  Here, it is resources construed as all-purpose goods that constitute the object of distribu-
tion. “Resources” (or “goods”) is a general term that encompasses material goods (money, jobs, 
property), social goods (chances, privileges, prestige), and political goods (rights, authority, 
liberties). The term chosen is deliberately broad because it can then subsume everything that a 
society deems valuable, attributable, and a potential object of a just distribution. Rights, liber-
ties, chances, self-respect, and human dignity are goods in a broader sense, goods that we value 
and would like to possess. Of course they are a special type of goods and differ from goods of 
consumption. Rights, liberties, and chances do not simply exist as natural goods. Rather, they 
are created through the organization of our social existence. They are created when a society 
regulates the distribution of other goods. This means that both in the case of material goods and 
when it comes to rights and opportunities, we regulate moral entitlements; that is, entitlements 
detailing which goods, rights, and opportunities one can legitimately expect and how one may 
use them. Also, the question of which rights and duties ought to be accorded to whom is resolved 
in the same way as the question of the distribution of goods. The principles of distributive justice 
that determine who is entitled to what, when, and according to which principle determine the 
claims that citizens ought to mutually accord one another from a moral point of view. In this way, 
they establish moral rights and the corresponding duties. Providing a justification for (specific) 
rights is nothing other than intersubjectively justifying a distribution of certain types of goods as 
something that one must mutually accord to one another as a consequence of a mutual recogni-
tion as equals.
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The example of the distribution of a cake is frequently used in this context and 
shows how obvious this principle is:25 a parent wishes to share a cake among 
his or her children—how should he or she do this if we assume that all children 
would like their slice to be as large as possible? If no child can advance a con-
vincing reason why his or her slice should be larger than everyone else’s, then 
the cake must be divided into equally large pieces. Or—to use an often cited 
example in the discussion on the equality of distribution26—how should the 
crew of a ship that has landed on a desert island distribute the local resources? 
Relevant reasons for an unequal distribution would be, for example:  needs, 
acquired rights, merit, and maximizing utility.
The presumption accords a primacy to equal distribution only in terms of 
formal reasoning. Unequal distribution requires justification; equal distribution 
does not. In principle, this is compatible with every form of inequality insofar as 
it can be justified. However, it allocates the burden of proof in a way that makes 
it more difficult to justify inequalities. We find a similar presumption effective in 
criminal proceedings: as long as doubts about the relevant facts persist, i.e., as 
long as a case has not been proven to the judge, a criminal sentence may not be 
imposed (in dubio pro reo). 27 Here, too, the burden of proof lies with the one who 
seeks to justify an unequal treatment (in this case, a specific judicial sentence): it 
is not that the accused must prove his innocence, but that the state or prosecutor 
must prove his guilt. This principle is analogous to the presumption of equality.
8.3 Different Accounts of the Presumption
So how does one explain that numerically equal distribution has priority and 
why must the onus probandi lie with the proponents of unequal distribution? To 
begin with, one must grant the critics that the presumption of equality, when-
ever it is mentioned in the pertaining literature and discussions at all, is rarely 
argued for.28 Some authors hold that this presumption can be inferred from the 
25  See Isaiah Berlin, “Equality as an Ideal,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61 (1955–
56):  301–326, at 305; Ernst Tugendhat, Vorlesungen über Ethik (Frankfurt a.M.:  Suhrkamp, 
1993), 373 f.; id., Dialog in Leticia, 69; id., “Gleichheit und Universalität in der Moral,” in id., 
Moralbegründung und Gerechtigkeit, ed. Marcus Willaschek (Münster: Lit, 1997), 11.
26  See Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources.”
27  The ‘in dubio’-postulate is mainly referred to as a judicial specification of the presumption 
of innocence, which in turn is deduced in different ways from and thus founded on constitutional 
norms, such as the rule of law, basic rights, and human dignity.
28  Exceptions are Ernst Tugendhat in Vorlesungen über Ethik, 373 f. and Dialog in Leticia, ch. 
III, esp. 68, who must be given credit for being one of the few who developed a normative argu-
mentation for the presumption of equality, and Wilfried Hinsch, “Angemessene Gleichheit,” 
in Modelle politischer Philosophie, ed. Rolf Geiger, Jean-Christophe Merle and Nico Scarano 
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formal equality postulate that stipulates that “like cases be treated alike.”29 From 
this, they argue, it should follow that all individuals must be treated equally as 
long as no reasons for an unequal treatment can be found. But the presumption 
of equality can in fact not be immediately deduced from the formal equality 
postulate: the mere absence of specific reasons for unequal distribution cannot 
ipso facto ground a claim to universalization. Otherwise, this would imply that 
the relevant situations in question have already been identified as being equal 
in a normatively relevant sense. But what is it that should be treated equally in 
the first place? There are situations in which we do not even know which cases 
can count as being equal. I venture that the presumption of equality ought to be 
applied even when it has not yet been determined whether all cases to be con-
sidered for distribution are equal in a prescriptive sense. Therefore, the formal 
equality postulate does not contain the presumption of equality. Similarly, the 
presumption cannot be deduced from proportional equality, for this contains 
a prescription only for cases that are nonequal. The presumption of equality, 
by contrast, applies to cases where no relevant reasons either for equality or 
inequality in treatment can be identified.
More frequently, it is argued that we know the presumption to be valid by 
intuition. Often the above mentioned example of the cake is then used as a kind 
of circumstantial evidence—equal distribution should evidently follow simply 
because there is no specific reason that justifies unequal distribution. But if we 
rely on our intuitions to confirm a normative principle, we must ask ourselves 
where, in turn, this intuition stems from, and whether there are any other plau-
sible explanations at hand. For example, with reference to the cake-case, it is 
not clear (to say it again) why equal distribution should follow simply from the 
fact that reasons for unequal distribution are absent—one might also argue, 
for instance, that it is the children’s positive claim to their parent’s equal care 
and respect that grounds an imperative of numerically equal distribution.
Moreover, the appeal to the presumption’s intuitive plausibility often seems 
to operate by way of exclusion:  if there are (ex hypothesi) no reasons for one 
particular kind of unequal distribution, then what, many people argue, would 
be left but the option of equal distribution? It seems, then, that for them, equal 
distribution is the default setting, as it were, unless a case can be made for 
(Paderborn:  Mentis, 2003), 260–271. According to Tugendhat, justifying morals, gener-
ally speaking, means justifying it to all. The concept of justification is, to him, thus more basic 
than moral principles and already contains a reference to equality. For a critique of Tugendhats 
argument, see the essays in Markus Willaschek (ed.), Ernst Tugendhat. Moralbegründung und 
Gerechtigkeit (Münster: Lit, 1997).
29  For a review of the relevant literature and critique see Westen, Speaking of Equality, 233, 
esp. fn. 8.
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reasonable exceptions. But this reasoning precludes alternative possibilities 
for filling this vacuum. For it must be taken into account that those in favor of 
unequal distribution do not, as a rule, attribute an intrinsic value to inequal-
ity.30 Instead, they refer to a rule with a specific content, usually along the lines 
of the meritocratic idea that distribution should reflect individual achieve-
ment. Therefore, it is—as we shall see shortly—very well possible to think of 
reasonable, well-grounded justifications for an unequal distribution even in 
those cases where an immediate reason for unequal distribution is lacking: the 
just solution to situations such as these does not necessarily have to be numeri-
cal equality.
And this would in fact not be inconsistent with the presumption, insofar as 
the latter includes the possibility of there being material reasons for unequal 
distribution:31 if one counter-factually assumed that all distributable goods 
were always distributed completely according to criteria such as needs, merit, 
and other differential criteria, and if one further assumed that these criteria 
were universally acceptable as a justification for unequal distribution, the pre-
sumption would indeed never become effective. It could be compatible with a 
highly stratified pattern of distribution. It is only because, empirically, it is very 
unlikely that all distributable goods are always distributed completely along 
justified criteria such as needs, merit, and so on, that there is normally space 
for the presumption to come into play.
In order to gauge arguments for and against the presumption of equality, we 
must thus posit such a situation where criteria for a justified inequality either 
do not apply or, if they do, still leave some goods that remain to be distributed. 
If this is assumed, certain goods must be left over for whose equal or unequal 
30  Such a position, which to my knowledge nobody has ever put forward, must fail for the same 
reasons as a position that ascribes equality an intrinsic value. Intrinsic egalitarians regard equality 
as desirable even if the equalization would be of no use to any of the affected parties—e.g., when 
equality can only be produced through depressing the level of everyone’s life. But something can 
only have an intrinsic value when it is good for at least one person, i.e., makes one life better in 
some way or another. The well-known “leveling-down” objection indicates that doing away with 
inequality in fact ought to produce better circumstances—it would otherwise be unclear why 
equality should be desired. (For such an objection see Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 
(New  York:  Basic Books, 1974), 229; Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 1986), ch. 9, 227, 235; Larry Temkin, Inequality (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), 247–248.).
31  Whether merit constitutes a justified reason is subject to debate and may, at this stage of 
our argument, remain undecided because this question cannot help us to arbitrate between the 
presumption and possible alternatives. Many contemporary theories of justice consider merit, 
however, a morally arbitrary criterion for distribution (cf. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 2nd 
ed. (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press [1971], 1999), 64 f., 87 f.; cf. Gosepath, Gleiche 
Gerechtigkeit, ch. V. I. 2. f).
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distribution no convincing material reasons can be found. Only in this situation 
can the presumption be put to the test. Thus, the presumption of equality does 
not apply, in the first place, as an alternative option to certain material reasons 
of—equal or unequal—distribution but only, in the second place, as a default 
option if these material reasons do not allow for a complete (equal or unequal) 
justified distribution for all goods.
Why—this is thus the follow-up question that needs to be asked now  –
should numerical equality be the standard for distribution in situations where 
there are no reasons for inequality but positive reasons for an equal distribu-
tion of goods are similarly lacking? After all, one could think, prima vista, of 
three not implausible alternatives to this presumption of equality. (1) Where 
positive reasons in favor of equality or inequality are absent, all possible ways 
of distribution (including equal distribution) assume an equal (or indifferent) 
standing, and thus all would be equally acceptable. (2)  In this case of moral 
indifference, another possibility would be to randomize the outcome so that 
in the last resort not all possibilities of distribution would be equally accept-
able but (with an indifferent starting position) only that kind of distribution 
that owes its existence to a random factor. A variant of this idea is the notion 
of the protection of acquired possession:32 property is often defended on the 
grounds of the historical or “natural” character of its distribution; for example, 
in the case of a country’s natural resources or because the free market pro-
duces, through mechanisms of supply and demand, a certain allocation of 
goods that the current possessors then claim to be theirs.33 (3) A third alterna-
tive would be to refrain from a distribution of goods for as long as no positive 
reasons for equality or inequality can be put forward until a reasonable case 
can be made for redistribution. In a world where all goods have already been 
distributed, this option also results in the protection of acquired possessions; 
all goods then remain the property of their former possessors. If the existing 
factual relations of property cannot be justified on their own grounds (and if 
they could, this would mean that, contrary to the original premise, positive 
32  The protection of possession is, in my experience, one of the most commonly used criteria 
of “distribution.”
33  This inequality cannot ex hypothesi be defended on the grounds of individual attributes 
(such as merit or need), but at most on the grounds that the natural or social processes which have 
resulted in the distributional pattern in question can—for identifiable reasons—be considered as 
justified. See Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. If Nozick’s argumentation were successful, the 
justified, historically evolved patterns of distributions could be regarded as well-founded excep-
tions from the presumption of equality. However, I agree with many critiques of Nozick. See, for 
example, Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), ch. 4.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Aug 19 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199331109.indd   180 8/19/2014   3:30:54 PM
 T h e  P r i n c i p l e s  a n d  t h e  P r e s u m p t i o n  o f  E q u a l i t y  181
arguments for that distribution do exist), then again we would end up with a 
historically contingent allocation.
All in all, it thus seems that the different variants of the idea to random-
ize distribution present a serious alternative to the presumption of equality. If, 
however, historical evolution of distribution or simple randomization are seen 
as substantial acceptable reasons for unequal distribution—e.g., when they are 
considered as “God’s will”—then they are no longer alternatives to the pre-
sumption but must be examined as possible candidates for justified inequali-
ties within the presumption’s framework: they would then apply for as long as 
it is possible to identify a certain pattern of distribution as “truly random” or 
“truly historically evolved;” in cases where it is impossible to decide which dis-
tribution fulfills this requirement, however, the presumption of equality could 
still be used as a standard of action or decision.34 An argument in favor of the 
presumption, such as I now wish to present, must thus exclude random distri-
bution as an alternative principle of distribution—but it need not do more (e.g., 
refute random distribution per se as a form of justified inequality).
8.4 A Substantive Justification in Favor of  
the Presumption
The argument in favor of the presumption of equality, I  propose, can be 
obtained from two premises whose plausibility is largely accepted and that are 
closely connected to the abstract notions of justice and moral equality as they 
have been introduced in the beginning of this paper. The first premise (which 
will be referred to as the “principle of adequacy”) follows from the explica-
tion of the concept of justice and maintains that justice requires the adequate, 
impartial and formally equal consideration of everyone’s moral and legal 
claims. It is generally agreed that the meaning of justice is that an action is just 
if, as a result, everybody is given what they are entitled to. By definition then, 
every kind of justice is based on entitlement and appropriateness. Arbitrariness 
would violate the principle of adequacy. From the point of view of justice, 
every situation may only be judged on the basis of those objective features that 
are relevant for an adequate consideration of an individual’s moral rights. That 
which cannot be justified as just can, from a normative point of view, no longer 
34  In some situations, principles of historical priority (such as ‘first come, first served’ or 
standing in line) and fair lottery (such as the flipping of a coin) may indeed provide the best stan-
dard of procedure, especially if the goods to be distributed are not divisible in a way that would 
allow every interested person to receive a share and thus a method must be found that grants 
everybody the same chance of receiving the desired good.
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be sustained. The second premise is the requirement of justification and stems 
from the explication of the principle of moral equality or equal human dignity 
or from the principle that people should be treated as equals. Norms can be 
regarded as justified if, and only if, free and equal persons, who wish to regu-
late their co-existence by means of such norms, are rationally able to agree on 
the norms in question. The principle of justification specifies what constitutes 
a good justification of the adequacy of a situation or action; namely, only that 
kind of justification that takes the interests of all those concerned into equal 
consideration. The principle of justification thus determines in which respect 
a situation or action is adequate.
The presumption, I submit, follows from the two premises in the following 
way: since every person must be able to claim for himself all advantages, and in 
particular, all goods in his possession on the grounds of reciprocal and general 
reasons, together, the principle of justification and the equal consideration of 
all subjective (moral or legal) claims require a justification for situations that can 
in principle be changed. A situation that can be changed is subject to the claim of 
justice; that is to say, its justice or injustice must be established by means of the 
principle of justification and be corrected as necessary. The equal and adequate 
consideration of all subjective claims demands that suum cuique—each have 
his own. A different allocation of goods can only be justified on the grounds 
of relevant differences among all those concerned. Only such differences that 
are relevant in terms of distribution can justify unequal treatment as adequate 
to each and every person. An unequal distribution without such justification 
would be arbitrary. Justice, however, requires the exclusion of all arbitrariness. 
Thus where no relevant differences exist (either because no one can stake a 
justified claim to certain goods in the first place or because all demands have 
been satisfied), everyone must receive the same amount of goods.35
In public distribution, anyone who lays claim to more than an equal share 
owes all others an adequate universal and reciprocal justification. If this can-
not be provided, i.e., if there is no reason for unequal distribution that can be 
universally and reciprocally justified to all,36 then equal distribution is the 
35  This is not a pragmatist justification of the presumption. A pragmatist justification is, how-
ever, presented by Edna Ullmann-Margalit in “On Presumption,” Journal of Philosophy 80, no. 3 
(1983), 143–162, esp. 155, who argues for the presumption as a means to overcome a stalemate in 
a practical deliberation. Louis Katzner argues in “Presumptions of Reason and Presumptions of 
Justice,” Journal of Philosophy 70, no. 4 (1973), 89–100 and “Presumptivist and Nonpresumptivist 
Principles of Formal Justice,” Ethics 81, no. 3 (1971), 253–258 that the presumption is only justifi-
able on the grounds that it will lead to the least damage to all.
36  This is based on the assumption that all are, by and large, equal in the relevant sense; oth-
erwise, their apparent differences in the relevant sense would provide reasons for unequal treat-
ment or distribution.
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only legitimate principle of distribution. How could it be otherwise? Any 
unequal distribution would mean that someone receives less, and another 
more. Whoever receives less can justifiably demand a reason for being disad-
vantaged. Yet there is ex hypothesi no such justification. Hence, any unequal 
distribution is illegitimate in this case. If no convincing reasons for unequal 
distribution can be brought forward, the only option remaining is that of equal 
distribution. Equal distribution is therefore not merely one alternative among 
many, but rather the inevitable starting point that must be assumed insofar as 
one takes the justificatory claims of all to be of equal weight.
Does the presumption really follow from the two premises? 37 Possibly, one 
could accept the argument that we are often in possession of something or 
that we have certain general advantages that we cannot justify generally and 
reciprocally. But, one could critically object, why does it follow from there that 
this possession or advantage should be given away? Thus the problem remains 
of how to deal with morally indifferent possessions or advantages for which 
no justification can be given. Again we are faced with the preservation of his-
torically contingent distribution or the principle of random choice as possible 
alternatives to the presumption.
Having presented the argument in favor of the presumption of equal-
ity, however, we can now show why these apparent alternatives are not, in 
fact, solutions:  it is because the presumption follows from the justification 
requirement. The justification requirement morally applies to all possibili-
ties of distribution. If one assumes ex hypothesi that there are no good rea-
sons for an unequal distribution, then random distribution is no justifiable 
alternative to the presumption; it violates the principle of adequacy. If goods 
are distributed at random, differences will result that cannot be justified on 
grounds of individual differences between persons. The distribution does 
not do justice to those concerned, even if the unequal treatment is not an 
expression of an (unjustified) explicit rejection of the principles of equality. 
Every person may demand justification as to why he or she should have been 
assigned less by lot than another person, and why he or she should accept 
this. Thus, random choice is not universally justifiable as a distribution 
procedure.38
From the first premise, moreover, one can extract an additional second 
one: namely, that we may only speak of a condition as being just if we can 
37  On the argumentation against the presumption, see Thomas Schramme, “Die Anmaßung 
der Gleichheitsvoraussetzung,” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 51, no. 2 (2003), 255–275; 
Harry Frankfurt, “Equality as a Moral Ideal,” Ethics 98, no. 1 (1987), 21–42.
38  Unless the persons concerned have intersubjectively agreed in some cases to distribute by 
allotment on a random basis and thus this distribution is justified.
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conceive of all distributable goods as being distributed according to the 
principles of justice. Already existing distributions must be justifiable on 
the grounds of the well-known consideration that, in a hypothetical situ-
ation, they would have come about in just this way, i.e., by an adequate 
consideration of the individuals’ moral rights. Every other conceivable dis-
tribution (random or already existing) does not as such take into account 
the individuals’ moral claims. Thus, random choice, again, does not fulfill 
the condition of adequacy. Conditions that are inadequate, not justifiable, 
and therefore unjust are morally in need of correction, as can be inferred 
from the aforesaid first premise based on the concept of justice. This is why 
the objection mentioned (‘I may not have a justified claim to my possessions 
but why should anyone else have one?’) fails. If the principle of justification 
is not fulfilled, then the requirement of justice is consequently violated, 
too, as not everyone is considered as equal. We are confronted with an 
unjustified and therefore unjust condition that can and must be converted 
into a just one. Thus any kind of random choice is excluded (unless it oper-
ates within the framework of the presumption as a candidate for justified 
inequalities).
In situations such as these, where universally acceptable reasons for both 
equal and unequal distribution are lacking, only the presumption of equality 
fulfills the adequacy condition because it treats equal cases equally. If none 
of the concerned persons can lay claim to a relevant difference, then all cases 
are, in this respect, prima facie equal and must be treated equally in order to 
be treated adequately and justly. This is why, according to this reasoning, a 
society may take away a person’s unjustified advantage or property and equally 
distribute it among its members.
This is the argument for the presumption.39 It demonstrates that equal 
distribution is not merely one alternative among many, but rather the inevi-
table starting point that must be assumed insofar as one takes the justificatory 
claims of all to be of equal weight.
The argument has also shown, however, that the presumption is not inde-
pendent of a substantive moral conception of what a just distribution entails: it 
explains the significance of equality as a default option while simultaneously 
clarifying the very meaning of equality.
The presumption of equality provides an elegant procedure for construct-
ing a theory of distributive justice. The following questions would have to be 
answered in order to arrive at a substantial and full principle of justice. What 
goods and burdens are to be justly distributed (or should be distributed)? 
39  For this argumentation, see Gosepath, Gleiche Gerechtigkeit. A comparable argumentation 
can be found to my knowledge only in Hinsch, “Angemessene Gleichheit.”
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Which social goods comprise the object of distributive justice? What are the 
spheres (of justice) into which these resources have to be grouped? Who are 
the recipients of distribution? Who has a prima facie claim to a fair share? What 
are the commonly cited, yet in reality, unjustified exceptions to equal distribu-
tion? Which inequalities are justified? Which approach, conception or theory 
of egalitarian distributive justice is therefore the best? How such a theory of 
justice will look is another matter.40
40  I developed such a theory in Gosepath, Gleiche Gerechtigkeit.
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